A younger generation of authoritarian leaders in 21 st century China, who are ambitious to push through an aggressive reform agenda, needs to establish the political authority to carry out reforms. Anti-corruption serves that objective well. Firstly, the campaign removes political foes in central ministries and regions. Xi's top-down anti-corruption enforcement is focused, surgical and in any event, well-managed, with a clear agenda of excising the empire of Zhou Yongkang. Most high profile detentions to date under Xi's leadership have been related to people who are directly or indirectly associated with Zhou.
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Secondly, actual or potential political supporters are elevated to powerful positions. By removing political enemies, news leaders are able to create vacancies and thus place their supporters in powerful positions. In China's political system, a change of leadership at the top is not followed by a significant reshuffling of key positions. Because of deeply entrenched factional politics in China, it is more difficult for a new leader in China than it is in democracies to appoint a new team to positions of power in order to implement new policies. Facing with entrenched resistance, state leaders resort to alternative means, including anti-corruption enforcement, to create vacancies in political positions and reward their supporters with those positions. An anti-corruption campaign provides Xi with both sticks and carrots.
5 They include 蒋洁敏, 王永春、李华林、冉新权, 王道富, 沈定成, a l l f o r m e r o r c u r r e n t m e m b e r s o f t h e C N P C ( 中石油) and Shengli Oil Field (http://news.wenweipo.com/2014/02/22/IN1402220013.htm; 中石油一周 5 高管落马 反腐能否反出石油 亲民; for the on-going prosecution of Liang Jiemin, see http://news.sina.com.cn/c/2014-04-10/115029903148.shtml); former personal secretaries, 李華林, 沈定成, 冀文林, 郭永 祥 ; a p p o i n t e e s i n S i c h u a n i n c l u d i n g 李春城 (formerly deputy Party Secretary) 李崇禧 (formerly deputy Party Secretary), and 郭永祥 ( f o r m e r l y e x e c u t i v e d e p u t y g o v e r n o r ) ; r e p r e s e n t a t i v e i n t h e p u b l i c s e c u r i t y i n c l u d i n g L i D o n g s h e n g , d e p u t y M i n i s t e r o f P u b l i c s e c u r i t y ( http://www.open.com.hk/content.php?id=1642#.UwhFrOOSy4k); a n d s t a t e s e c u r i t y , i n c l u d i n g L i a n g K e , B u r e a u C h i e f o f t h e B e i j i n g S t a t e S e c u r i t y B u r e a u , (http://news.wenweipo.com/2014/02/22/IN1402220015.htm).
Thirdly, Xi's anti-corruption campaign can reaffirm the political loyalty of powerful regional and sectoral leaders in provinces, ministries and SOEs. Anti-corruption enforcement is an entry point into the existing political system to ensure diverse political interests follow instructions from Beijing. As the Anti-Corruption Action Plan states clearly, one key objective of the anti-corruption campaign is to tighten up overall discipline within the Party so that the whole party is united in its thoughts and action under Xi's leadership. The "shock and awe" policy aims to send strong messages to stakeholders and monopoly interests that Xi can remove them if they are deemed disloyal.
By using anti-corruption laws as a weapon, Xi can overcome possible obstacles created by entrenched interests in implementing his reform policies set out in the Third Plenum
Resolutions. Politicians and bureaucrats may be deeply corrupt, but Xi has to rely on them to implement his reform plan. Deng Xiaoping initiated his reform in the late 1970s
and bought bureaucrats' acquiescence to his reform agenda by allowing cadres to enrich themselves; Xi Jinping seeks to achieve his policy goal by threatening to take away everything that they have acquired over the past decades.
Finally, anti-corruption enforcement is instrumental in providing much needed legitimacy and credibility. 6 The high profile campaign, particularly the wide spread investigation and quick removal of corrupt officials, demonstrates a strong anti-corruption political will and capability. Anti-corruption is extremely popular among the general public and in the private sector as wielding a sword of Damacles over the heads of senior leaders provides much needed legitimacy to Xi. Firm centralization of power, quick decision-making and 6 Barry Naughton, "After the Third Plenum: Economic Reform Revival Moves toward Implementation," The disciplinary system has been partially rejuvenated since 2005 when the CCDI and CDI were respectively authorized to dispatch a disciplinary official to be stationed in government departments and SOEs of the respective central and local levels. The intention was to create a degree of external supervision over government departments (异 体监督). For instance, the CCDI sends disciplinary officials to central ministries or
SOEs directly under central control, and the dispatched disciplinary officials are directly accountable to the CCDI alone. However, the enforcement of this policy has not been effective. While the disciplinary official dispatched may be appointed by and accountable to the CCDI, he or she is often effectively co-opted by the government office which he or she supervises. The end result is that the supervisory system is effectively internalized and the system becomes largely self-regulatory (同体监督) leading to a near paralysis of the disciplinary system at the operational level.
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There have been pilot schemes to make CDI supervision more meaningfully independent of the government departments it supervises. For example, instead of sending one CDI head to be stationed in one government department, the CDI in Hubei province set up a supervisory office in 2009 in which a number of disciplinary officials jointly supervise eight provincial government departments without being stationed in any of those 8 The failure is characterized as: "看得见的管不着，管得着的看不见；顶得住的站不住，站得住的顶 不住；干得好的上不去，上得去的干不好" 纪检监察派驻机构改革:从"同体监督"到"异体监督" http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2010-04/06/c_1218383.htm departments. The objective of such a policy was to avoid cooption and to concentrate resources for more effective external supervision.
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A more difficult relationship that has not been effectively managed is the relationship between a CDI and the respective Party Committee, the crucial question being whether the CDI which supervises a Party Committee of the respective level is structurally part of the Committee or a supervisory body independent of the Committee? According to the CCP Charter, a CDI is a parallel body to the Party Committee and both are created by, and accountable, in theory, to it. The institutional design is such that the Party Committee at each level, being the organ of supreme political power, is watched closely by a disciplinary arm of the Party Congress.
But that design has been compromised by two institutional mechanisms that effectively reduce and marginalize the supervisory power of a CDI. According to the Party's personnel system, a higher Party Committee controls the appointment of key officials of a Party Committee at the next lower level. Significantly, all the officials with the rank of minister/provincial governor are placed on a central list and are accountable directly to the central authority. They are appointed, monitored and removed directly by the Ministry of Organization (MoO). Likewise, they are subject to the control of the CCDI for the purposes of disciplinary matters and anti-corruption investigation.
10
An equally significant difficulty relates to the political practice which renders the CDI an integral part of the provincial political system. The structural rub is that the CDI head is 9 纪检监察派驻机构改革:从"同体监督"到"异体监督" http://news.xinhuanet. In order to avoid cooption, the Party has adopted three related measures to enhance central control over the provincial level CDIs. The first is the restructuring of the CCDI to enhance its political and operation capacities; the second is to strengthen the control of By January 2014, the heads of 21 provincial level CDI were appointed directly by the CCDI, including six from central ministries and 15 from other provinces. 15 It is important to note that this practice of appointing a CDI head at a lower level directly by the CDI at the next higher level is long established. In that sense, although the current wave of parachute appointments and transferring provincial CDI heads may be unprecedented in terms of scale, it can also be seen as the continuation of a policy that has long been in existence.
Once a centrally appointed head is in place, there is more hands-on control over 
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The CIG's jurisdiction is broad and goes beyond corruption in the narrow sense.
Officially, the CIGs are expected to focus on four issues in their inspection which are broadly defined to include bribery; collusion with business for self enrichment; extravagant life styles; and "political discipline" with a special focus on compliance with central policies and abuse in the appointment of officials.
The CIGs' work is divided into three stages during an inspection: discovering problems, reporting problems that are discovered and ensuring that proper action is to be taken to solve the problems. Since the CIGs do not have disciplinary powers, their principal function is to discover problems and to report their findings to proper authorities for action. To facilitate their inspection, the CIGs have three general powers exercisable in the course of inspection: 1) to receive reports, hear complaints, organize meetings, and conduct opinion surveys; 2) to organize meetings, visit officials, and review and copy documents; and 3) to conduct confidential interviews with individual officials of varying ranks. Throughout the four rounds of inspection to date, individual interviews are said to have been the most common and effective method of obtaining information. 18 At the end of an inspection, the CIGs will report their significant findings to the central authorities.
Xi and the entire politburo are debriefed by the CIGs.
Secondly, the CIGs report their findings on particular cases to relevant organizational or disciplinary authorities for action. The CCDI has undertaken to expedite cases that are referred to it by the CIGs. 19 Each inspection has led to the down fall of a number of highranking officials in the respective provinces, ministries and enterprises. The CIGs are publically, specifically instructed to search for "tigers" and are warned clearly of the potential consequences of negligent investigations. Given the prevalence of corruption, the CIGs are not expected to return to Beijing empty-handed. Naturally, provinces which are to be inspected would experience tremendous consternation and anxiety until a "tiger" shortcomings in its anti-corruption work and pledge to undertake the necessary action.
The meetings, together with the problems that have been identified, are typically published on the front page of the provincial newspapers.
There are further procedural innovations differentiating the four rounds of central inspections from earlier practice. It has been emphasised that the CIG is only temporary and that each group created to carry out one particular inspection is disbanded immediately after the inspection. Group leaders and their deputies are also appointed on an ad hoc basis. The stated intention of this practice is to allow constant change of CIG leaders to avoid the inspectors being corrupted by local and sectoral interests.
There are highly targeted inspection and routine inspections, with the former focusing on specialist auditing of individual institutions. The key difference is that, while routine inspection aims at discovering corruption through inspection, targeted inspection is proactive investigation of corruption that is known to the CCDI. Targeted CIG inspection started in the third round of inspection and was conducted at the Ministry of Science and an "online pusher team", in collusion with opinions leaders and public intellectuals, creates a virtual "navy" to fabricate news, disturb public order, and undermine social stability. 31 The chilling effect of a series of prosecutions is still being strongly felt in the virtual world and beyond. 34 Public prosecution is possible in the following circumstances where a case 1) has caused mass events; 2) has caused public disorder; 3) has caused ethnical or religious conflict; 4) has defamed a large number of persons and led to heinous social impact; 5) has harmed the state image and seriously endangered state interest; 6) has caused heinous international impact; or has caused other serious harm to social order and state interest. Article 3, Interpretation. The Xi government is committed to anti-corruption enforcement on the paramount condition of its monopoly over the entire process. At the same time, the Xi regime has launched the most systemic anti-corruption campaign to date. Xi is able to silence the social media and to diminish if not disable its anti-corruption functions by punishing opinion leaders, de-registering accounts and crippling civic activism by criminal punishment of the movement's leaders and activists. Xi may look to a "big society" in providing more cost-effective social services; however, bottom-up anti-corruption activism based on a vibrant civil society advocating social change is another matter altogether. 
Marginalizing Law
Xi's campaign further shifts power from legal institutions to the Party's disciplinary mechanism. Compared with anti-corruption work under the previous government, the current campaign more decisively bypasses legal procedural and institutions. After a brief moment in which law seemed to be able to play a central role in the anti-corruption process, legal institutions have been effectively marginalized to the role of initiating anticorruption purges of "tigers". There is no longer any meaningful discussion on the end goals and limits of shuanggui, the Party's power to detain its own delinquent members as well as anti-corruption by a more neutral state body. Law may provide authority and legitimacy to support the Party's investigation but will emphatically not be tolerated as a hurdle to a concerted anti-corruption campaign. Indeed, the people who bitterly complain about the lack of credibility of anti-corruption investigations are the investigators in China's anti-corruption authority (ACA) (反贪污贿赂局), with the principal complaints being a lack of independence in initiating investigations and deference to the Party's inhouse disciplinary organ.
To be fair, the ACA has continued to deliver in the political circumstances it is constrained by. According to the national ACA director Xu Jinhui (徐进辉), the number of anti-corruption cases that the ACAs have investigated between January and November 2013 reached 27,236 involving 36,907 officials, representing an increase of 6.8% and 6.3% This blunt instrument was apparently able to achieve its objective in the first year of the policy's implementation: conference spending and sangong spending by the central government was reduced by 53% and 36% respectively. Spending on entertainment in 31 provinces was reduced by 26%. The objectives were achieved by imposing disciplinary action: more than 30,000 servants were investigated for violating the two sets of rules leading to 7,600 disciplinary sanctions.
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While Xi has demonstrated a strong determination and more forceful implementation, caution should be exercised not to exaggerate the success of measures adopted. The senior officials who have been investigated or punished belong to two categories. The first one is Xi's political enemies, the investigation of which is politically motivated and serves an express agenda. Judging by the profiles of the officials who fell from grace, they were primarily officials associated with his political nemesis, Zhou Yongkang, who are occupying important offices in security, Sichuan province, and oil fields. The purge of Zhou and his associates has been applied over the whole of Zhou's political career, ensnaring his family members, proté gé s along with businessmen and officials who owed their success to, or had dealings with, him.
Beyond political enemies, Xi's other targets are mixed, but mainly officials who are semi-retired to the "second line" and no longer holders of real political powers. In point of fact, Xi may not really be after "tigers", but merely aims to punish officials who hold "second line" offices with high status but lacking political power, such as deputy chairmen of Provincial People's Congress Standing Committees or deputy chairmen of Provincial Political Consultative Conferences.
What is the best way to conceptualize Xi's anti-corruption campaign? It is widely recognized that while the heavy-handed top-down campaign may have a short-term deterrence impact on wide-spread corruption, it does not tackle the root causes which are arguably embedded in the political system. Wang Qishan has famously said that the anticorruption campaign does more harm to the Party as an organization than to the individuals under investigation. Removal of a larger number of senior officials produces a shock wave throughout the Party and it will take a long while for wounds to heal. The Party is prescribing tough medicine and shock therapy for corruption and the current campaign in many aspects is extremely destructive. The surgical operation that is ongoing and likely to be continuing for several years to come is not aimed at long term anticorruption capacity building. Again to quote Wang Qishan, the shock therapy is used to address the symptoms, that is to stop the further spreading and deepening of corruption and its intention is to buy time for Xi to tackle the root cause issues, that is to develop better institutional designs and improve the overall political accountability.
How or even can the twin imperatives of the political need for short term impact and the long term goal of stamping out corruption be reconciled remains a tough question that has not been meaningfully debated or carefully researched. Perhaps inevitably the crackdown has to be selective given the prevalence of CCP corruption and the crude, ham-fisted approach is intended to achieve a goal that is broader than anti-corruption itself. As argued above, the anti-corruption campaign is orchestrated to eliminate Xi's political enemy and overcome real or potential resistance to Xi's reform agenda; legitimizing the new government and regain popular support; most significantly, Xi hopes, through force and discipline, to bring the bureaucracy on board. To do so, Xi needs political patronage and authority, and fighting corruption is an expedient tool to achieve this end.
There is an optimistic view that holds once the dust stirred up by the anti-corruption campaign has settled, Xi's government will turns its attention to institutional reforms, Secondly, power is further shifting from legal institutions to political institutions, particularly the Party's internal disciplinary system. The Party has repeatedly proclaimed its control over anti-corruption work; moreover, due to its top-down nature and a specific focus on senior ranking leaders, the current campaign largely bypasses existing legal procedures and legal institutions, leading to a further marginalization of the rule of law.
Finally, power is shifting from civil society back to the Party. President Xi proves equally harsh and effective in quashing corruption and civil society mobilization against corruption. In doing so, Xi is undermining the very institutions, such as the freedom of press or public participation, that may prove the most effective in reigning in corruption in the long run. In imposing a monopoly on China's anti-corruption enforcement, Xi has effectively silenced vocal critics bringing the social media practically to its knees through a series of repressive measures.
Of course, anti-corruption is a political necessity that is immensely popular. However, the campaign style as it has been carried out can hardly be sustainable, as top anti-corruption leaders such as Wang Qishan readily concede. To quote Wang, the Party is using the anticorruption campaign to buy the time that the Party needs to develop sound anticorruption institutions and tackle corruption at its root. 
